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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:  
THE STATUS OF STANDARDS BETWEEN 1890 AND 1910 
 
Conor McCormick1 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses judicially developed standards for 
reviewing administrative actions in the United Kingdom between 
1890 and 1910. By exploring the context, reach, types and 
frequency of judicial review during that timeframe – fin de siècle – 
this historical analysis reveals both significant changes and 
significant continuities by comparison with twenty-first century 
standards. 
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1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (‘UK’) as it existed between 1890 and 
1910 (‘the relevant timeframe’) was in some ways very different 
and in other ways very similar to modern times in respect of 
judicial standards for reviewing administrative actions. Charting 
such change and continuity makes historical legal research on this 
topic a uniquely important type of scholarship. An uncontested 
historical account can, for example, operate as a source of further 
constitutional continuity; whereas a contested history can 
stimulate debates which may lead to change2. In spite of its 
importance, historical legal analysis centred primarily on the 
empirical study of judicial decisions, as this paper does, is 
somewhat scarce. A contextual backdrop situating that analysis in 
its broader historical setting is provided in the first and second 
sections which follow this introductory paragraph. Most of the 
remainder of the paper focuses on key law reports printed during 
the relevant timeframe which disclose evidence about judicial 
thinking in relation to administrative law questions concerning 
the appropriate reach and various types of review. A short section 
detailing a separate quantitative analysis on the frequency of 
administrative law cases decided by UK courts during the 
relevant timeframe follows these enquiries, preceding some 
concluding remarks on the findings of the paper as a whole.  
 
 
2. The Historical Context 
The UK itself was constituted somewhat differently in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely as the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland3. Moreover, 
variances between the constituent nations of the UK as it then was 
calls for an immediate word of warning to readers of this paper. 
The focus herein is on the state of administrative law in England 
                                               
2 J. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European 
Effects (2007) 40. 
3 Great Britain then comprised, as it does today, the three nations of England, 
Scotland and Wales. Only the six counties comprising what would come to be 
known as Northern Ireland would remain in the Union subsequent to the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act 1922. 
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and Wales within the relevant timeframe4. This means that 
distinctive traits of the Scottish legal system, in particular, are 
generally treated with the same ‘respectful silence’ other writers 
have felt compelled to use in order to avoid misrepresentation or 
trivialisation of that system arising from limitations of time and 
resources5. It can be noted briefly, nonetheless, that the Scottish 
system of judicial review evolved differently from that of the 
English system in several significant respects. While the grounds 
of review which developed in the Scottish system closely 
resembled those that developed in England and Wales, for 
example, where such grounds could be established the Scottish 
Court of Session exercised its supervisory jurisdiction by way of 
general remedies which were likewise available in private law 
actions (namely reduction; declarator; suspension and interdict; 
specific performance and specific implement) rather than by way 
of special public law remedies akin to the prerogative writs 
(certiorari; prohibition; mandamus) recognised in England and 
Wales6. Consequently, it has been suggested that:  
 
….whereas in English law the three prerogative 
orders enabled the court to exercise an integrated 
supervisory jurisdiction in the public law field, in 
Scotland it has not been possible by reference to 
judicial remedies alone to identify a distinct branch 
of judicial practice; nor has the law in Scotland been 
                                               
4 Stephen Sedley describes public law in England and Wales as having been 
‘effectively uniform’ as of when the two countries were unified by legislation in 
the sixteenth century, at least until the coming of devolution in 1998: S. Sedley, 
Lions under the Throne: Essays on the History of English Public Law (2015) 1. The 
jurisprudence of England and Wales is also commonly assumed to have been 
mirrored by judges across the Irish Sea during the relevant timeframe. Given 
that the remit of this study meant it was not possible to conduct a systematic 
comparison of the law reports for Ireland (or Scotland) and those for England 
and Wales, the verification of that assumption has had to be parked for another 
occasion. 
5 Ibid. 
6 A. Bradley and C. Himsworth, Administrative Law, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia, 2000 Reissue, at para 4. 
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dominated, as has often been the case in England, by 
the restraints of a remedy-based system7. 
 
The character of English judicial practice and the restraints 
of the prerogative writ system will be explored in greater detail 
below, but for now let it suffice to note that even within the UK it 
is arguable that the extent to which there existed a ‘common core’ 
of administrative law during the relevant timeframe is uncertain.  
While the UK Parliament had established its legislative 
supremacy as a consequence of the constitutional struggles in 
seventeenth century England, public administration was of course 
carried on by government delegates of one sort or another. Justices 
of the peace, who once functioned as ‘all-purpose administrative 
authorities’, gave way over time to a more diversely labelled array 
of administrators such as councils, boards, commissioners, 
authorities and so on8. Subsequent to the abolition of the Star 
Chamber (an executive-controlled body closely associated with 
the arbitrary rule of the Stuart monarchy)9 and a substantial 
reduction in the powers of the Privy Council (an order of 
noblemen from whom the reigning monarch took advice) 
resulting from the Glorious Revolution10, common law courts 
‘stepped into the breach’ and assumed a supervisory role over 
public administrators11. A major consequence of the Stuarts’ failed 
attempt to remove government affairs from common law 
jurisdiction was to create ‘an all but invincible prejudice against 
encroachments upon the province annexed by the common-law 
courts in the field of public law’ which was buttressed by ‘the 
exceptional degree of public esteem earned by the superior judges’ 
                                               
7 Ibid.  For further discussion on the distinctive development of judicial review 
in Scotland, see C. Himsworth, Judicial Review in Scotland, in B. Hadfield (ed.), 
Judicial Review: A Thematic Approach (1995); L. Clyde and D. Edwards, Judicial 
Review (1999). 
8 W. Wade and C. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th ed. (2009) 11-12. 
9 S. Galeotti, The Judicial Control of Public Authorities in England and in Italy: A 
Comparative Study (1954) 28. 
10 An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for Taking Away the 
Court Commonly Called the Star Chamber (16 Car I c 10). For a detailed 
discussion about the historical evolution and present day roles of the Privy 
Council, see: D. Rogers, By Royal Appointment: Tales from the Privy Council – The 
Unknown Arm of Government (2015). 
11 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 12. 
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who had established their independence of the executive12. This 
sequence of historical events became constitutional in the sense 
that they operated as a ‘permanent obstacle to any development of 
a dual system’ of courts resembling those which flourished 
elsewhere in Europe13. A similar sort of prejudice was later 
effectuated by Diceyan insularity, which will be addressed further 
in due course. 
In the absence of specific legislation passed for the purpose 
of delimiting the role of the courts in their supervisory role, and 
the related absence of a specially designated administrative court 
system, the ordinary courts incrementally developed their own 
supervisory jurisdiction over a new range of administrative 
authorities in the UK. The main exception to this general tendency 
of the legislature to leave the courts to their own jurisdictional 
devices is the relatively significant structural reform which 
occurred in the 1870s. The ancient courts of common law, 
chancery, admiralty, probate and divorce were all supplanted by a 
Supreme Court of Judicature which was sub-divided into a High 
Court of Justice and a Court of Appeal14. The High Court of Justice 
consisted of divisions that closely corresponded to the older courts 
which it replaced, though ‘all three divisions were empowered to 
dispense law and equity alike’15. Thus, while the Chancery 
Division continued to administer a familiar jurisdiction, the new 
Queen’s Bench Division ‘amalgamated the once disparate 
common law jurisdictions of the King’s Bench, Exchequer and 
Common Pleas’ – though this amalgamation did not take effect 
‘until the chief justices of the erstwhile separate courts had retired’ 
in 188116. The newly constituted Court of Appeal subsumed 
jurisdiction over matters which had previously been held by a 
range of appeal courts17. The creation of this court, among other 
things, called into question the future of the appellate jurisdiction 
of the House of Lords, which would have been abolished were it 
                                               
12 J. Evans, De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. (1980) 5-6. 
13 S. Galeotti cit. at 9. 
14 Judicature Acts 1873-1875. 
15 S. Anderson, Public Law, in W. Cornish and others (eds.), The Oxford History of 
the Laws of England: Volume XI: 1820-1914 (2010) at 525. 
16 T. Watkin, The Legal History of Wales, 2nd ed. (2012) 171-172. 
17 Judicature Acts 1873-1875. 
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not for considerable conservative opposition to the proposal18. In 
the end, a ‘double appeal’ system was retained; first to the Court 
of Appeal, then to the House of Lords. Thus, as Baker points out, 
while ‘the court established under the 1873 Act kept the name 
Supreme Court of Judicature’, its supremacy had been ‘snatched 
from it before birth’19. By way of a compromise between reformers 
and traditionalists, the judicial House of Lords which in fact 
topped the court hierarchy was, from 1876, staffed by professional 
judges styled as ‘Lords of Appeal in Ordinary’ who sat in the 
House in a non-parliamentary capacity20. It should be noted, 
however, that while judicial sittings took place separately from 
parliamentary sittings at this time, the formal Appellate 
Committee of the House which prefigured the UK Supreme Court 
that exists today was not established until 1948 and thus after the 
relevant timeframe21.  
The contentious and radical rationalisation of court 
structures set out above stands in stark contrast to the legislative 
vacuum in which the interconnected procedures and standards for 
judicial review had developed by the relevant timeframe, and 
which remained untouched by legislative intervention throughout 
it. It is unsurprising, therefore, that there is a broad consensus 
among legal historians as to the fact that the substantive law of 
judicial review blossomed primarily within the confines of an 
ancient procedural framework inherited by the common law 
courts of several generations22. The writ system is of course the 
procedural framework in question, and a short summary of its 
                                               
18 R. Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body 1800-1976 
(1979) at ch 2; D. Steele, The Judicial House of Lords: Abolition and Restoration 1873-
6, in L. Blom-Cooper, B. Dickson and G. Drewry (eds.), The Judicial House of 
Lords 1876-2009 (2009). 
19 J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (1990) 163. 
20 Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876; R. Stevens cit. at 18. 
21 J. White, The Judicial Office, in L. Blom-Cooper, B. Dickson and G. Drewry 
(eds.), The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 (2009) at 36. On the constitution of 
the current UK Supreme Court, see: Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Pt 3; A. Le 
Seur, From Appellate Committee to Supreme Court: A Narrative, in L. Blom-Cooper, 
B. Dickson and G. Drewry (eds.), The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 (2009). 
22 See, for example: E. Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: 
Certiorari and Mandamus in the Seventeenth Century (1963) 1-2; P. Craig, 
Administrative Law, 8th ed. (2016) 4. 
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provenance is a necessary precursor to any informed analysis of 
how judicial standards for review developed.  
Writs were originally sealed royal orders issued by the 
monarch in order to, for example, serve notices or demand 
information23. Dissatisfied royal subjects could initially petition 
the King directly to complain of injustices resulting from decisions 
made by the courts within his realm, hoping that the King might 
then decide to exercise his prerogative to issue remedial writs to 
those courts24. By the twelfth century royal interventions of this 
nature ceased to be available from the King personally and were 
instead issued indirectly via the King’s Court, and by the mid-
thirteenth century the categories of writ which were available 
from the King’s Court had ossified into an exhaustive Register of 
Writs25. The inflexible formality created by these procedural 
strictures meant that writs once obtainable for certain distinct 
purposes had to be creatively adapted by the courts of common 
law in order to serve different purposes, so as to protect new 
public interests brought about by changed societal conditions. As 
such, long before the advent of the industrial age closely 
preceding the relevant timeframe, the writ system had been 
transformed into a judicial apparatus for reviewing previously 
unimaginable government responsibilities for administering 
public functions relating to factories, welfare, railways and public 
health, among others26. The particulars of what had come to be 
classed as the main ‘prerogative writs’ of certiorari, prohibition 
and mandamus will be discussed at more appropriate junctures 
below, but it is of historical significance that each of those 
common law remedies had developed largely in isolation from 
one another, only coming to be grouped together over a century 
after they had acquired their respective ‘prerogative 
characteristics’27. Prerogative characteristics were retrospectively 
exemplified by those discretionary remedies which judges sitting 
primarily on the King’s Bench would issue where a recognised 
cause could be established, according to the demands of justice 
                                               
23 H. Woolf and others (eds.), De Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th ed. (2016) at 857. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 P. Craig cit. at 22, 36-39. 
27 H. Woolf and others (eds.) cit. at 23, 858-860. 
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which certain royalist judges had been keen to associate with the 
King’s benevolence towards his subjects28.  
In tandem with these advances towards administrative 
oversight within the common law court system, there developed 
in Chancery two equitable remedies – firstly, injunctions; and 
subsequently, declarations – which by the relevant timeframe had 
assumed some complementary importance in respect of 
administrative actions. Their particulars, as with the prerogative 
writs, will be extrapolated in greater detail below. For now, the 
relative adaptability of equitable remedies as compared with ‘the 
labyrinthine by-ways of the common law prerogative writs’ is 
highlighted in advance29. The particular flexibility of injunctions, 
which had their origins in what would now be termed private law 
disputes, were easily adapted as a means of reviewing 
administrative authorities who encroached upon property rights30. 
Considerably restrictive court practices evolved, however, so as to 
prevent the ordinary citizen from seeking injunctions against 
administrative actions or inactions without the Attorney General’s 
fiat in many circumstances31. It is likewise important to note by 
way of background that declaratory judgments were heavily 
opposed by the judiciary for a long period of time immediately 
prior to the relevant timeframe. In the 1877 case of Hampton v 
Holman, for instance, the then Master of the Rolls resolutely 
affirmed that ‘where the Court is asked to do nothing more than to 
declare future rights, it is clear that the Court will not make any 
declarations as to future rights’; despite arguments in favour of 
relaxing that rule having been put to him by counsel32.  
 
 
3. The Ahistorical Context 
The foregoing account on the shaping of constitutional and 
procedural structures within which administrative law developed 
prior to the relevant timeframe typifies the inescapably haphazard 
nature of its history in the UK, a quality which is equally 
discernible from the relevant timeframe itself. Disentangling the 
                                               
28 ibid. 
29 H. Woolf and others (eds.) cit. at 23, 875. 
30 S. Galeotti cit. at 9, 31. 
31 J. Evans cit. at 12, 430-433. 
32 Hampton v Holman (1877) 5 Ch D 183, 187. 
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vast store of ‘uncoordinated judicial activity’33 which might be 
said to have constituted a body (in this sense analogous, perhaps, 
to the body of Frankenstein’s monster) of administrative law 
within the relevant timeframe is thus, as will soon become clear, a 
difficult and necessarily selective task. Before embarking upon 
that task, however, one more preliminary issue must be 
addressed. An ahistorical impression of administrative law in the 
UK as it was within the relevant timeframe abounds in various 
contexts due to the regrettable influence of Professor Albert Venn 
Dicey’s pernicious claim that none did or should exist34.  
Dicey’s claim was fuelled by a ‘fallacious comparison’ with 
the specialised administrative courts of France which, he 
mistakenly alleged, conferred ‘a whole body of special rights, 
privileges, or prerogatives’ on government officials and was thus 
incompatible with his conception of the rule of law35. This was 
because Dicey’s conception of the rule of law was premised, in 
part, on the idea that ‘every man, whatever be his rank or 
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’36. Law 
reports of the time provide abundant evidence, however, 
demonstrating that the English judiciary had developed ‘a system 
of judicial supervision of public administration closely paralleling 
the jurisdiction of the French Conseil d’État, itself a powerful and 
independent tribunal, albeit constitutionally part of the 
administrative structure’ by cleverly adapting the common law 
and equitable remedies available to them37, as explained in the 
previous section of this report and explored further in the sections 
which follow this one. That is to say nothing of the many other 
critiques which have been levelled at Dicey’s thesis, such as its 
failure to address the extensive immunities from ‘ordinary law’ 
                                               
33 G. Drewry, Judicial Review: The Historical Background, in M. Supperstone, J. 
Goudie and P. Walker (eds.), Judicial Review, 5th ed. (2014) 13. 
34 A. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 
at ch 5. Note that Dicey also published a second (1886) and third (1889) edition 
of his text prior to the relevant timeframe; a fourth (1893), fifth (1897), sixth 
(1902) and seventh (1908) edition during the relevant timeframe; and his final, 
eighth (1915) edition was published shortly after the relevant timeframe. 
35 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 20. 
36 A. Dicey cit. at 34, 177-178. 
37 S. Sedley cit. at 4, 64. 
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enjoyed by various public officials38. It is widely believed that 
Dicey’s ‘xenophobic antipathy to France and to civil law systems, 
which he regarded as autocratic and Napoleonic’ blinded him to 
the historically undeniable existence of English administrative law 
during his lifetime39. There are some scholars, however, who 
credit Dicey for having indirectly influenced the shifting of the UK 
constitution in a ‘civil administrative direction’ by stimulating 
others to correct his revisionist and neglectful accounts of the 
administrative landscape in its institutional, remedial and 
theoretical guises40. 
At least two related consequences which are significant to 
the present study flowed from Dicey’s denialism in respect of 
administrative law in the UK. The first is that Dicey’s heritage is 
said to have engrained a culture of disengagement with the 
subject of administrative law by generations of lawyers and judges 
influenced by his ahistorical doctrines. It is claimed by some 
writers, for example, that his influence was responsible for a rise 
in judicial deference in respect of judicial supervision over 
administrative actions in the ensuing decades41. Secondly, Dicey’s 
glorification of the English model is thought to have considerably 
affected the level of insularity which prevailed in the wake of his 
scholarship. That is to say, Dicey’s method inculcated a culture of 
superiority in the UK by presenting different jurisdictions ‘not as 
actual or potential sources of influence, but as anti-models with 
which to demonstrate the peculiarity of … his analytical scheme of 
the English law of the constitution’42. The temporary prominence 
of Dicey’s denialism thus resulted in an unwarranted distinction 
between the UK and other European legal systems, which appears 
to have impeded any significant reference to those systems in the 
UK courts as they each grappled with much the same issues of 
administrative law. 
                                               
38 H. Arthurs, Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business, 17 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 (1979) 6. 
39 S. Sedley cit. at 4, 270. 
40 J. Allison, The Spirits of the Constitution, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), 
Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (2013) 36-45. 
41 G. Drewry cit. at 33, 18. Drewry refers to commentators who depict Local 
Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120 as being symptomatic of the alleged 
increase in judicial deference resulting from Dicey. This point will be briefly 
revisited below. 
42 J. Allison cit. at 2, 9. 
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4. The Reach of Judicial Review 
The messy nature of UK administrative law history adverted 
to above makes it possible to analyse courts during the relevant 
timeframe with reference to a variety of possible considerations, 
such as: 
 
…the classes of factual situations in which their 
jurisdiction may [have been] invoked, the purposes 
for which that jurisdiction must or may [have been] 
invoked, the forms of proceedings in which it [was] 
invoked, the nature, characteristics and effects of the 
remedies and sanctions they may [have awarded], 
and the conditions that [had to be] satisfied before 
any form of judicial relief or particular remedies and 
sanctions [were] obtainable43.  
 
To avoid an ‘intolerably prolix and repetitive’ analysis44, 
however, this paper eschews the temptation to deal with all 
possible viewpoints exhaustively and instead dwells on two 
specific perspectives which encompass a good range of pertinent 
material. The reach of judicial review during the relevant 
timeframe is the first of these perspectives and forms the focus of 
this section, while the types of judicial review available during the 
relevant timeframe is the second perspective and is dealt with 
hereafter. The reach of judicial review is an expression intended to 
refer to the legal gateways through which individuals could 
request judicial intervention in respect of administrative actions, 
as well as both the credentials required of individuals likely to be 
granted such requests and the characteristics of administrative 
authorities which judges did and did not recognise as being 
subjectable to review. By virtue of the remedy-based system which 
had developed by the relevant timeframe, the reach of review was 
inherently limited by the purposes for which each judicial remedy 
had developed, in addition to the enduring issues of standing and 
amenability. These issues will now be considered with regard to 
                                               
43 J. Evans cit. at 12, 21-22. See also: S. De Smith, Wrongs and Remedies in 
Administrative Law, 15 Modern Law Review 189 (1952) 189-190. 
44 J. Evans cit. at 12, 22. 
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each of the main remedies in turn, followed by a short critical 
overview of their collective coherence. 
 
 
4.1 Prohibition and Certiorari 
The writs of prohibition and certiorari developed 
independently of each other and although they had come to be 
very similar in scope by the relevant timeframe, their separate 
origins did result in some notable distinctions. Prohibition, the 
oldest of the prerogative writs, was devised primarily in order to 
prospectively limit the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts45, but 
came to be used as a common method of prospectively reviewing 
administrative authorities46. By the relevant timeframe, the 
purpose of the writ was understood to be for the protection of ‘the 
prerogative of the Crown and the due course of the administration 
of justice’; which was effectuated ‘by prohibiting [an] inferior 
Court from proceeding in matters as to which it [wa]s apparent 
that it ha[d] no jurisdiction’47. Indeed, the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that prohibition was demandable as of right, in contrast 
to the entirely discretionary nature of both certiorari and 
mandamus, where lack of jurisdiction was apparent from the face 
of the proceedings48. Prohibition remained discretionary, 
however, in cases where want of jurisdiction was ‘latent’ rather 
than ‘patent’49. Other judges put the same point a different way, 
by referring to an apparent distinction between ‘total’ and ‘partial’ 
want of jurisdiction50. Certiorari, on the hand, had its origins as a 
royal demand for information by way of certification51. By the 
relevant timeframe, it had become a means of removing an order 
already made by an inferior court into the King’s or Queen’s 
Bench, where it could be quashed for want of jurisdiction. This 
definition highlights a further distinction, namely that while 
                                               
45 For an example from the relevant timeframe, see: R v Tristram and Another 
[1902] 1 KB 818. 
46 J. Baker cit. at 19, 166. 
47 Farquharson v Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552, 556. 
48 ibid. 
49 Farquharson v Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552, 557. 
50 Farquharson v Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552, 564, citing Jones v Owen (1845) 5 D & L 
669. 
51 J. Baker cit. at 19, 170-171. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 10   ISSUE 1/2018 
61 
 
prohibition would lie against the decision of a court with its own 
special jurisdiction, such as an ecclesiastical court, certiorari would 
only lie against an inferior court administering the same temporal 
law as judges of the King’s or Queen’s Bench52. However the most 
obvious difference between the two writs was of course the 
appropriate time at which they might be sought. Prohibition was 
better suited to reviewing activities at an earlier stage than 
certiorari, given its preventative purpose, whereas the quashing 
effect of certiorari was more likely to be sought at a later stage 
either in isolation from53; as an alternative to54, or in conjunction 
with55 prohibition.  
The rules about whom could avail of these two writs were 
also very similar but marginally distinguishable. Two contrasting 
views had developed by the relevant timeframe as regards the 
standing requirements for prohibition. Some judges distinguished 
between the availability of prohibition to individuals who were 
personally unaffected by the matter about which review was 
sought and its availability to the party aggrieved by the alleged 
want of jurisdiction on which an application for review was 
made56. Only in the latter case would locus standi cease to be a 
matter of discretion for the court and issue ex debito justitiae.57 
Other judges regarded it as their general duty to guard against 
excesses of jurisdiction and would thus accept requests for review 
from anyone at all, whether they were directly affected by the 
matter at hand or a total stranger to it58. During the relevant 
timeframe this difference of views appears to have been 
determined in favour of the former approach by the case of  
Farquharson v Morgan, wherein the Court of Appeal indicated that 
if there existed judicial discretion about whether to award 
prohibition – as a result of latent, rather than patent, want of 
jurisdiction – matters such as laches or misconduct on the part of 
                                               
52 The accuracy of this point was confirmed in R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury 
and Ipswich Diocese, ex p White [1948] 1 KB 195. 
53 R v Carter and Another [1907] 1 KB 298. 
54 Gozney v Bristol Trade and Provident Society [1909] 1 KB 901. 
55 R v His Honour Judge Snagge and Others [1909] 1 KB 644. 
56 Forster v Forster and Berridge (1863) 122 ER 430, 435. 
57 ibid. 
58 Worthington v Jeffries (1875) LR 10 CP 379, 382. 
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the applicant could influence a court’s decision whether to grant 
prohibition59.  
There seems to have been less tension between competing 
judicial views as regards the standing requirements for certiorari, 
with the weight of judicial opinion falling firmly in favour of an 
approach requiring some sort of interest in the proceedings about 
which review was sought in all circumstances. The leading case in 
this respect is R v Nicholson, in which it was held that certiorari 
could be refused where an applicant failed to show they had ‘a 
peculiar grievance of their own beyond some inconvenience 
suffered by them in common with the rest of the public’60. In 
addition to allowing certiorari to be refused where no 
particularised grievance could be established, the court also held 
that ‘no sufficient ground for the issue of the writ’ would exist 
where an applicant had only a ‘small’ interest in the matter at 
hand61. The theoretical difference between locus standi for 
prohibition and certiorari thus appears to have been that where a 
patent excess or abuse of jurisdiction could be established, 
prohibition would be issued as of right whereas certiorari would 
only ever lie if the applicant had some personal interest in the 
determination of the issue62. That having been said, subsequent 
cases within the relevant timeframe suggest that judges 
interpreted the latter requirement liberally. Thus in the case of 
Cobbold, for example, certiorari was granted to applicants who 
were ‘only rivals in trade’ with the individual to whom an 
alehouse licence had been granted63. Lord Alverstone CJ held that 
‘it would be too strong to say that [the rival brewers] had not a 
sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to apply’64. The 
degree to which apparently restrictive judicial theories were 
reflected in ostensibly liberal judicial practices as regards the locus 
standi requirements for these remedies is therefore open to some 
doubt. 
Certain statutes in force during the relevant timeframe 
provided that the proper mode of challenging a new authority 
                                               
59 Farquharson v Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552, 559. 
60 R v Nicholson (1899) 2 QB 455, 471. 
61 R v Nicholson (1899) 2 QB 455, 472. 
62 S .Galeotti cit. at 9, 198. 
63 R v Groom and Others, ex p Cobbold and Others (1901) 2 KB 157, 161. 
64 R v Groom and Others, ex p Cobbold and Others (1901) 2 KB 157, 162. 
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established by the statute was by way of certiorari. This 
automatically brought those bodies within the reach of judicial 
review; a power which, in the case of financial auditors appointed 
by a Local Government Board, the courts were willing to construe 
particularly broadly in 1906. Thus in the case of Roberts, the Court 
of Appeal construed its jurisdiction under the Public Health Act 
1875 to review ‘erroneous’ audit decisions as encompassing a 
power to review errors of both law and fact, bringing the judicial 
role in such proceedings closer to that of an appeal about the 
merits of the impugned decision65. On the contrary, however, a 
range of statutes from this time also included provisions of 
various sorts that were included for the specific purpose of 
excluding judicial review by the ordinary courts66. The judicial 
construction of such provisions during the relevant timeframe was 
less activist, in terms of minimising their impact in the interests of 
preserving judicial oversight, than it would become in later 
decades. For example, subordinate legislation in the form of the 
Register of Patent Agents Rules 1889 made by the Board of Trade 
under authority provided by the Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks Act 1888 was treated by the House of Lords ‘as if’ made in 
pursuance of that primary Act ‘for all purposes of construction or 
obligation or otherwise’67. This is a clear example of secondary 
legislation rendered immune from judicial review due to the 
protection afforded by the cloak of parliamentary sovereignty, as 
Paul Craig has pointed out68.  
A further reduction in the amenability of certain authorities 
to review developed through the common law at the beginning of 
the relevant timeframe. The functions of licensing justices in 
particular, who had been conferred powers to grant and renew 
beerhouse licenses upon the reinstatement of that regime in 1869, 
were characterised as ‘administrative’ rather than ‘judicial’ 
                                               
65 R v Carson Roberts [1908] 1 KB 407, relying on R v Haslehurst (1884) 13 QBD 
253. 
66 P. Craig cit. at 22, ch 28. 
67 Institute of Patent Agents and Others v Lockwood [1894] AC 347, 361. Paul Craig 
notes that this decision is difficult to reconcile with the later authority of R v 
Minister of Health, ex p Yaffe [1931] AC 494, but given that it falls outside the 
relevant timeframe that tension is not explored in any further depth herein. See 
cit. at 22, 876-877. 
68 P. Craig cit. at 22, 876. 
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functions in the 1898 case of Sharman69. This had the very 
significant effect of rendering their decisions beyond the reach of 
judicial review – which the courts had decided would only attach 
to judicial or quasi-judicial functions70. There followed several 
years within the relevant timeframe wherein the licensing justices 
enjoyed immunity from the reach of prohibition and certiorari as a 
result, which caused increased resort to mandamus in their 
place71. This immunity was eventually brought to an end, 
however, by the 1906 Court of Appeal decision in Woodhouse72. 
Indeed, Woodhouse was part of a broader judicial trend towards 
enlarging ‘the sphere of judicial and quasi-judicial activities, as a 
means of enlarging the scope of the writs of prohibition and 
certiorari’ in cases not involving licensing justices73. Thus, by way 
of illustration, an appeal had decided that the term judicial could 
in fact refer to two meanings: ‘to the discharge of duties 
exercisable by a judge or by justices in court, or to administrative 
duties which need not be performed in court, but in respect of 
which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind – that is, a 
mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters 
under consideration’74. It was relatively clear by this point, 
therefore, that the reach of certiorari and prohibition would not be 
determined with reference to the character of whichever authority 
                                               
69 R v Sharman and Others, ex p Denton [1898] 1 QB 578, 580. 
70 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 407-408. Wade and Forsyth explain that the 
term ‘quasi-judicial’ was used to describe administrative powers which had to 
be exercised judicially, and thus in conformity with the demands of natural 
justice (including the right to be heard by an unbiased decision-maker, and so 
on). Robson heavily criticised ‘the picture conjured up of a quasi-judicial court 
presided over by a quasi-judge administering quasi-law in quasi-disputes. The 
quasi-parties give their quasi-evidence; the tribunal finds the quasi-facts and 
considers the quasi-precedents and quasi-principles. It then applies the quasi-
law in a quasi-judicial decision which is promulgated in a quasi-official 
document and given quasi-enforcement. The members of the tribunal, having 
concluded their quasi-judicial business, then go out and drink quasi-beer before 
taking lunch consisting of quasi-chicken croquettes. They then go home to their 
quasi-wives’. See: W. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the 
British Constitution (1951) at 495-496. 
71 S. Anderson cit. at 15, 501. 
72 R v Woodhouse and Others [1906] 2 KB 501. 
73 S. Galeotti cit. at 9, 36. 
74 Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Party Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 
QB 431, 452. 
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was involved but rather with reference to the character of the 
impugned act or decision75. The high watermark in this regard 
would come in the form of a House of Lords decision shortly after 
the relevant timeframe wherein Lord Loreburn LC famously ruled 
that a duty to ‘act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides’ 
attached ‘upon every one who decides anything’76. More will be 
said about the context of that case in the section of this paper 
concerning procedural review. For present purposes it is enough 
to note that it was a fairly stiff, if transitory, corrective to the more 
reticent judicial developments preceding it. 
Tom Cornford’s claim that ‘neither certiorari nor 
prohibition seems ever to have been sought against the Crown 
itself nor against any Crown Servant exercising a power vested in 
the Crown prior to 1947’ is borne out by a thorough search of the 
relevant law reports77. It is therefore necessary to work from the 
assumption that the Crown itself was considered immune from 
prohibition and certiorari for the same reasons it was immune 
from mandamus, which will be considered in the sub-section 
hereafter78. Ministers of the Crown exercising statutory powers, 
however, appear to have been subject in principle (and in the 
absence of statutory ouster clauses) to the reach of both 
prohibition and certiorari79.  
 
4.2 Mandamus 
Originally, the writ of mandamus was used to restore 
individuals to offices and liberties which had been unjustly taken 
from them80. By the eighteenth century it had become something 
more than a writ of restitution given that it was then capable of 
being deployed for the purpose of compelling the performance of 
‘a wide range of public or quasi-public duties, performance of 
                                               
75 H. Woolf and others (eds.) cit. at 23, 865. 
76 Board of Education v Rice and Others [1911] AC 179, 182. 
77 T. Cornford, Legal Remedies Against the Crown and its Officers Before and After 
M, in M. Sunkin and S. Payne (eds.), The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political 
Analysis (1999) at 242. Cornford’s focus on 1947 is because that year saw the 
passage of the Crown Proceedings Act.  
78 ibid, citing Chabot v Lord Morpeth (1850) 15 QB 446. 
79 R v Minister of Health, ex p Yaffe [1931] AC 494; cf Institute of Patent Agents and 
Others v Lockwood [1894] AC 347.  
80 S. De Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 Cambridge Law Journal 40 (1951) at 50. 
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which had been wrongfully refused’81. It had developed into a tool 
of the King’s or Queen’s Bench by the relevant time frame, where 
it could be used to compel the discharge of duties incumbent upon 
both judicial and administrative bodies82. Although case law on 
the writ had grown considerably in number by the mid-nineteenth 
century, it features much less prominently in the law reports for 
the relevant timeframe on account of its diminished significance 
by then. The reasons for that diminishment relate to the reforms of 
local government which resulted in less dissatisfaction than had 
pertained in connection with the disorderly system they replaced; 
to the introduction of various statutory appeals which fulfilled the 
remedial role the writ had previously attended; and to the decline 
of freehold offices which had given quasi-proprietary rights to 
their holders that were enforceable by mandamus83. The remedy 
had also assumed a purely public character which meant that it 
would not be granted to enforce the private rights of company 
shareholders, for example, where the proper remedy was 
adjudged to be an injunction84. 
As mentioned above, the writ of mandamus was very much 
at the discretion of the courts during the relevant timeframe. The 
relevant tests for standing which applied thus shared some of the 
features explained above with respect to certiorari and prohibition 
(in cases of latent jurisdiction) in that some form of private right or 
interest had to be affected, though the duty owed to the applicant 
had to be of a public nature85. Early reports within the relevant 
timeframe show that judges found it ‘difficult to draw the line’, 
but held that mandamus would ‘lie on the application of a person 
interested’ in compelling officials to perform a public duty they 
had refused to perform86. In later reports, however, Wright and 
Bruce JJ took so seriously the requirement that an applicant for 
mandamus should hold a ‘legal specific right’ that they agreed to 
discharge a rule for mandamus primarily because of this technical 
                                               
81 S. De Smith cit. at 80, 51. 
82 ibid.  
83 H. Woolf and others (eds.) cit. at 23, 872. 
84 Davies v Gas and Light Coke Company [1909] 1 Ch 708. 
85 R v Secretary of State for War [1891] 2 QB 326, 335. 
86 R v Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313, 322; 
317. 
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objection87. The Lewisham District Board of Works, which had a 
statutory duty to put into force their powers relating to public 
health and local government, was thus refused the mandamus it 
had sought in order to compel the guardians of the poor of 
Lewisham Union to enforce the Vaccination Acts which applied in 
their district. Wright J emphasised that the court ‘would be far 
exceeding its proper functions if it were to assume jurisdiction to 
enforce the performance by public bodies of all their statutory 
duties without requiring clear evidence that the person who 
sought its interference had a legal right to insist upon such 
performance’88. However one finds the case of Cotham reported 
the following year, in which mandamus was granted in 
conjunction with certiorari to the vicar of a parish whose only 
interest in the matter was that he resided in the place to which a 
liquor license had been transferred89. Likewise, over a decade 
later, mandamus was granted to a group of individuals for the 
enforcement of a statutory provision which they had lobbied 
Parliament to pass into legislation90. The court acknowledged that 
there was inconsistency between Lewisham and Cotham but 
determined that it was unnecessary for it to endorse the approach 
taken in either case, choosing instead to simply decide the case 
before it in favour of those who sought ‘to enforce a clause which 
was obtained on their own petition’91. This would not deter future 
courts from mechanically citing Lewisham with approval on many 
occasions in later years as an unprincipled basis for restricting 
access to mandamus92. Reports from the relevant timeframe, 
however, suggest that locus standi generally presented no greater 
practical barrier to applicants for mandamus than it seems to have 
done in respect of certiorari. 
It was settled principle that while mandamus would issue 
to a broad range of public authorities, the Crown was not within 
                                               
87 R v Guardians of the Lewisham Union [1897] 1 QB 498. 
88 R v Guardians of the Lewisham Union [1897] 1 QB 498, 500. See also: R v 
Assessment Committee of the City of London Union [1907] 2 KB 764.  
89 R v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802. 
90 R v Manchester Corporation [1911] 1 KB 560. 
91 R v Manchester Corporation [1911] 1 KB 560, 563. 
92 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 588, citing as examples R v Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise, ex p Cook [1970] 1 WLR 450 and R v Hereford Corporation, ex p 
Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424. 
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its reach. These propositions were confirmed in the key case of R v 
Secretary of State for War during the relevant timeframe, wherein 
an army officer sought mandamus in respect of what he viewed as 
his entitlements under a royal warrant93. The court was clear that 
mandamus would lie against servants of the Crown as individuals 
where they had been ‘constituted by statute [as] agents to do 
particular acts’, but resolute in its ruling that it was ‘beyond 
question that a mandamus cannot be directed to the Crown or to 
any servant of the Crown simply acting in his capacity as 
servant’94. Royal warrants being matters of prerogative, and 
therefore a matter of guarded government discretion, the court 
refused to recognise mandamus as a tool for their enforcement95. 
This administrative law position differed from the private law 
position under the law of torts whereby, as Cornford explains, in 
tort ‘a Crown servant was liable in his personal capacity (e.g. as 
Lord Halifax) as opposed to his official capacity (e.g. as Secretary 
of State)’, whereas ‘a Crown servant could be made the subject of 
mandamus in his official capacity (e.g. as Secretary of State) where 
the duty sought to be enforced was imposed upon him in that 
capacity by statute’96. The distinction was rationalised by the 
theory that to grant mandamus against the Crown would be 
tantamount to the court granting it against itself as another 
notional part of the Crown97. Illogical though this may seem, it 
was an inexorable consequence of the unitary concept of the 
Crown that pertained in the UK at the time. The durability of the 
common law position encapsulated by R v Secretary of State for War 
is well illustrated by the fact that the position was, to the regret of 
some commentators98, unaltered by the Crown Proceedings Act 
1947 which for most other purposes made the Crown analogous to 
a private person. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
93 R v Secretary of State for War [1891] 2 QB 326. 
94 R v Secretary of State for War [1891] 2 QB 326, 334. 
95 R v Secretary of State for War [1891] 2 QB 326, 336. 
96 T. Cornford cit. at 77, 241. 
97 T. Cornford cit. at 77, 242. 
98 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 532. 
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4.3 Injunction 
As explained earlier, the prerogative writs were not the 
only means by which administrative actions could be reviewed in 
UK courts during the relevant timeframe. The equitable remedy of 
an injunction, and its equitable partner: the declaration, could also 
be claimed in ordinary civil proceedings against administrative 
authorities. Injunctions could be prohibitory and thus restrain an 
authority from committing an unlawful deed, or mandatory 
(though much less frequently worded in this way) and thus 
compel an authority to fulfil a public duty. The conceptual overlap 
between injunctions and the writs of prohibition and mandamus 
are to this extent quite clear. However the procedure whereby the 
equitable remedies were claimed in ordinary civil proceedings 
was different from the procedure for seeking prerogative writs 
from the Crown Side of the King’s or Queen’s Bench Division. 
Thus, although injunctions and declarations might have had 
similar effects to one or some of the prerogative writs, they could 
not be claimed in the same set of proceedings as prerogative writs 
in their own right or as additional or alternative relief99. Despite 
these procedural distinctions, it was possible by the relevant 
timeframe for any division of the High Court to dispense both 
common law and equitable remedies, as a result of the 
amalgamation of court structures discussed in the historical 
background section of this paper above; whereas beforehand 
equitable jurisdiction had been restricted to the Chancery benches.  
That having been said, the rationalisation of court structures 
did not eliminate certain jurisdictional differences between suits 
for equitable relief and those for the prerogative writs100. In 
particular, the rules about whom could apply for equitable relief 
and against whom the remedies would be granted differed 
somewhat. The important case of Boyce made it clear that private 
individuals would only be entitled to sue for an injunction in one 
of the following circumstances:  
 
                                               
99 M. Westgate, Declarations, Injunctions and Money and Restitutionary Remedies, in 
M. Supperstone, J. Goudie and P. Walker (eds.), Judicial Review, 5th ed. (2014) at 
616. 
100 North London Railway Company v Great Northern Railway Company (1883) 11 
QBD 30. 
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…first, where the interference with the public right 
[was] such as that some private right of his [was] at 
the same time interfered with (e.g., where an 
obstruction is so placed in a highway that the owner 
of premises abutting upon the highway is specially 
affected by reason that the obstruction interferes 
with his private right to access from and to his 
premises to and from the highway); and, secondly, 
where no private right [was] interfered with, but the 
plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffer[ed] 
special damage peculiar to himself from the 
interference with the public right101. 
 
These exceptions provided only a narrow gateway for 
individuals to sue on their own part as a means of restraining 
interferences with general public rights by administrative 
authorities. Indeed, the Boyce formula meant that mandatory 
injunctions could never be obtained by an individual, only 
prohibitory ones. The reasoning behind the restrictive approach in 
Boyce has been criticised because of its origins in the law of public 
nuisance, which is said to have been inapposite given that in the 
private law context there was no comparable separation between 
questions of locus standi and questions on the merits of a case102.  
Nonetheless, if neither of these narrow exceptions were 
fulfilled an injunction of either negative or positive effect could be 
sought by the Attorney General in one of two ways. In the first 
instance, the Attorney General could in theory act of his own 
motion, ex proprio motu, by either filing his own action or 
intervening in existing proceedings by virtue of his role as 
guardian of the public interest103. In almost all cases, however, the 
Attorney General was joined in proceedings at the instance of a 
‘relator’ (i.e. an informant). In such ‘relator actions’, private 
individuals would effectively request the Attorney General’s 
                                               
101 Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109, 114. 
102 P. Craig cit. at 22, 762. 
103 Within the relevant timeframe the closest case in point appears to be Lord 
Stanley of Alderley v Wild and Son [1900] 1 QB 256, wherein the Attorney General 
intervened in order to file an action against one of the parties praying for a 
declaration of the rights of the Crown in the matter and seeking an injunction 
against them to protect Crown property. 
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consent to use his name to take their case against the perpetrator 
of a public wrong of some kind. The Attorney thus acted as a 
jurisdictional filtering mechanism, and one which the courts were 
firmly unwilling to interfere with. In a ‘classic and often cited 
judgment’104, Lord Halsbury LC described the Attorney’s role in 
the following terms: 
 
If there is excess of power claimed by a particular 
public body, and it is a matter that concerns the 
public, it seems to me that it is for the Attorney-
General and not for the Courts to determine whether 
he ought to initiate litigation in that respect or not… 
[Furthermore,] the initiation of the litigation, and the 
determination of the question whether it is a proper 
case for the Attorney-General to proceed in, is a 
matter entirely beyond the jurisdiction of this or any 
other Court. It is a question which the law of this 
country has made to reside exclusively in the 
Attorney-General105. 
 
The courts were unwilling to entertain motions from the 
Attorney General, however, where the public rights he sought to 
have enforced were not ‘rights of the community in general’ but 
‘rights of a limited portion of His Majesty’s subjects’106. If an 
Attorney did commence litigation of the former variety, moreover, 
the judiciary was tenacious as regards its jurisdiction to determine 
the outcome. That is to say, it was ‘for the Attorney-General to 
determine whether he should commence litigation, but it [was] for 
the Court to determine what the result of that litigation [would] 
be’107. As such, it was not uncommon for courts to refuse relief 
sought at the instance of the Attorney General and thus take a 
                                               
104 J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown: A Study of the Offices of Attorney-
General and Solicitor-General of England with an Account of the Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions of England (1964) at 288. 
105 London County Council v Attorney General and Others [1902] AC 165, 168-169. 
106 Attorney General (on the Relation of the Spalding Union Rural District Council) 
and the Spalding Rural District Council v Garner and Another [1907] 2 KB 480, 486. 
107 Attorney General v Birmingham, Tame and Rea District Drainage Board [1910] 1 
Ch 48, 61. 
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different view as to the legal position supported by the UK 
government’s most senior legal official of the day108.  
In terms of which litigants the Attorney General was 
willing to support in relator actions during the relevant 
timeframe, it is clear from the reports that his fiat was granted not 
only to a considerable number of private individuals and groups, 
but also that it was given to a very broad and numerous range of 
administrative authorities. An example of the first instance is the 
Manchester Corporation case wherein the Attorney General 
successfully argued on the relation of a group of Manchester 
ratepayers that the Manchester Corporation had no power to 
spend the ratepayers’ money by carrying on a goods and parcels 
service beyond the tramways on which the Corporation had been 
empowered to do so109. A second example of this sort is the Mersey 
Railway Company decision, which enabled the Corporation of 
Birkenhead (consisting of shareholders in the Mersey Railway 
Company) to injunct Mersey Railway at the instance of the 
Attorney General for carrying on business as omnibus proprietors 
without any express legal power to do so110. On the other hand, in 
so far as relator actions taken at the request of administrative 
authorities is concerned, a good example is the Copeland case 
wherein an injunction against the owner of private land who had 
obstructed a pipe maintained by the highway authority for 
Bromley Rural District Council was sought by the latter by way of 
a relator action111. Indeed it is perhaps of some significance that 
the courts had become so accustomed to hearing the complaints of 
public authorities about the infringement of public rights by way 
of the relator system that they in fact took issue with attempts by 
such authorities to sue in their own right. Thus, in Tozer, the Court 
of Appeal held that  
 
where there is a public wrong, and where the local 
authority who have certain special rights to sue in 
                                               
108 For an interesting example, where an interlocutory injunction which had 
been granted was dissolved after consideration by a differently constituted 
Court of Appeal, see: Attorney General (on the Relation of the Monmouthshire 
County Council and the Same Council v Scott [1905] 2 KB 160. 
109 Attorney General v Manchester Corporation [1906] 1 Ch 643. 
110 Attorney General v Mersey Railway Company [1906] 1 Ch 811. 
111 Attorney General and Bromley Rural District Council v Copeland [1901] 2 KB 101. 
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their own name for certain special remedies, but 
have not done so, and are trying to put in suit a 
public wrong, they must do it in the recognised way, 
namely, at the suit of the Attorney-General112. 
 
The locus standi of administrative authorities to seek 
injunctions for the protection of public rights by way of judicial 
review was therefore subject to the same theoretical restrictions as 
ordinary citizens. Certain administrative organs of the state did, 
however, benefit from being ruled beyond the jurisdictional reach 
of injunctive relief. Parliament, in recognition of its sovereignty, 
was one such organ and, as such, an action would ‘not lie against 
the Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons for excluding a 
member from the House in obedience to a resolution of the House 
directing him to do so; nor [would any] Court grant an injunction 
to restrain that officer from using necessary force to carry out the 
order of the House’113. Moreover, as with the prerogative writs, 
while crown agents could be subject to injunctions the Crown 
itself could not114. Indeed, the general ‘immunity of public servants 
for acts done by their official subordinates unless a special 
mandate, or an adoption of the act purporting to be done on their 
behalf, is proved’ was confirmed during the relevant timeframe115. 
 
 
4.4 Declaration 
Uncoercive declaratory judgments were remedial 
latecomers to the UK court system. They seem to have their 
origins in the Court of Chancery, which would entertain claims for 
equitable relief through a procedure known as the petition of 
right116. This involved a petition by the ordinary citizen to the 
Crown, normally via the Attorney General, which the Crown then 
voluntarily (and, it would seem, invariably) referred to a  court of 
                                               
112 Devonport Corporation v Tozer [1903] 1 Ch 759, 762. See also: Tottenham Urban 
District Council v Williamson and Sons Ltd [1896] 2 QB 353. 
113 Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 217. 
114 Raleigh v Goschen [1898] 1 Ch 73. Note that the reasoning of Romer J in this 
case would later be relied upon heavily by Lord Woolf in his seminal judgment 
on crown liability in M v Home Office [1994] AC 377. 
115 Bainbridge and Another v Postmaster-General and Another [1906] 1 KB 178. 
116 J. Evans cit. at 12, 476-478. 
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law for determination117. It was in this important respect that 
declaratory remedies differed from the prerogative writs and 
injunctions: they were obtainable against the Crown118. A 
declaratory judgment was simply a statement of the law, with no 
accompanying form of coercive sanction against the impugned 
party. It appears, however, that for most of the nineteenth century 
UK judges were loath to grant purely declaratory judgments 
‘without doing or directing anything else relating to the right’119. 
By the relevant timeframe, the substantive and procedural 
availability of purely declaratory judgments had changed quite 
significantly, but judicial resistance to their use had persisted. 
Thus, after the amalgamation of the courts of common law and 
equity in the 1870s had transferred jurisdiction to award 
declaratory relief to all divisions of the High Court, that statutory 
power was interpreted so restrictively by the courts that it was 
essentially robbed of any practical effect120. Even after the Rule 
Committee for the High Court explicitly amended court rules to 
rectify this position – stating that no actions or proceedings would 
be open to objection simply because a purely declaratory 
judgment was sought121 – the judiciary repeatedly maintained that 
its jurisdiction should be exercised with ‘great care and jealousy’122 
and ‘extreme caution’123. Moreover, it appears that the remedy 
could only be sought by an individual without joining the 
Attorney General, as with injunctions, where the Boyce criteria 
discussed above were satisfied (though this does not seem to have 
been confirmed authoritatively until 1942)124. 
By the tail end of the relevant timeframe, however, the 
judiciary was gearing up for a decisive change in its approach to 
declaratory judgments. The Liberal Party government of the day 
secured the passage of a Finance Act in 1910 which empowered 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to demand certain 
                                               
117 W. Wade and C. Forsyth cit. at 8, 696-697. 
118 Like injunctions, however, declarations were not available in respect of 
parliamentary decisions: Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 217. 
119 Clough v Ratcliffe (1847) 63 ER 1016, 1023. 
120 See, for example: Hampton v Holman (1877) 5 Ch D 183, 187. 
121 RSC 1883, Order 25, r 5. 
122 Austin v Collins (1886) 54 LT 903, 905. 
123 Faber v Gosworth Urban District Council (1903) 88 LT 549, 550. 
124 London Passenger Transport Board v Moscrop [1942] AC 332, 345. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 10   ISSUE 1/2018 
75 
 
information from landowners and to penalise subjects who failed 
to comply with their demands. The Act did not contain any 
provisions empowering the Commissioners to require a statement 
from owner-occupiers that would reveal the annual value of their 
land. Nonetheless, a requirement of this kind was included in a 
notice delivered to a considerable number of UK subjects by the 
Commissioners. Unhappy with this ostensibly unlawful demand, 
a plaintiff by the name of Dyson commenced an action against the 
Attorney General as representing the Crown in September 1910 
claiming, inter alia, a declaration that he was under no obligation 
to comply with the notice125. In the following year, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed the High Court’s jurisdiction to judge the matter 
in spite of arguments from the Attorney General to the effect that 
such a claim was inappropriate because, he submitted, the proper 
procedure was to present a defence against any penalty imposed 
by prosecution and, in addition, that to allow the claim would 
open the floodgates to ‘innumerable actions for declarations as to 
the meaning of numerous Acts, adding greatly to the labours of 
the law officers’126. The High Court subsequently ruled in favour 
of Dyson127. Hailed as ‘turning-point’128 and a ‘breakthrough’129, 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment marked a new beginning for the 
declaratory judgment after it had endured many years of dubious 
utility. The importance of the judgment was threefold: it enabled 
citizens to initiate actions for judicial relief in the absence of a 
cause of action; it obviated recourse to the puzzling technicalities 
involved in seeking certiorari, and it provided access to justice 
where no other means of judicially reviewing administrative 
authorities was possible130.  
 
4.5 Summary 
The main remedies which operated as gateways to judicial 
review of administrative actions during the relevant timeframe 
arguably lacked collective coherence on account of their disparate 
historical ancestries. As the Law Commission would point out in 
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later years, the scope and procedural particularities of one remedy 
may have suited one case except in one respect; but another 
remedy which was not deficient in that respect may well have 
been unsatisfactory from other points of view; and, adding to 
these difficulties, an applicant may not have been able to apply for 
both remedies in one proceeding131. Thus, for example, an 
applicant seeking a prohibition or certiorari would have had to 
establish that the authority they sought to challenge was acting 
judicially, or at least quasi-judicially, whereas no such 
interpretative restriction on the availability of review would arise 
on an application for a mandamus, injunction or declaration.  
Likewise, if an applicant wanted to apply for a prohibition to stop 
some continuing unlawful conduct (other than in cases where 
want of jurisdiction was patent); a certiorari to quash an unlawful 
decision, or a mandamus to compel the performance of a public 
duty, they would have had to satisfy the theoretically restrictive 
standing requirements calling for a personal interest in the matter 
to be shown. If, on the other hand, they had sought an injunction 
or a declaration at the relation of the Attorney General, those 
arguments could have been avoided. That being said, the Boyce 
tests for standing which centred on an applicant’s private right or 
special damage would have had to be fulfilled if they were refused 
by the Attorney General. The significance of these hurdles is 
highlighted by the fact that, if granted, certiorari would quash (i.e. 
nullify) an impugned decision, whereas if a declaration was given 
no such effect could be ensured. Thus cases really were lost and 
won due to the selection of inappropriate remedies132, which 
meant prospective applicants had to exercise great care in 
considering the level of coercion in respect of an administrative 
authority they wanted to seek by way of judicial review. At the 
low end of the spectrum, a declaration would clarify an 
applicant’s rights while allowing the authority plenty of scope for 
deciding how to comply with a court’s ruling133. Certiorari, too, 
while nullifying a decision, would normally allow a decision 
maker freedom to reconsider the matter134. Prohibition or a 
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prohibitory injunction would be more intrusive, preventing the 
authority from doing something135. Mandamus and mandatory 
injunctions were of course the most coercive: requiring specific 
action to be done136. It is nonetheless important to note that the 
theoretical rules of justiciability, standing and amenability laid 
down in some of the cases explored above were subject to the 
interpretative inclinations and fidelity to precedent of judges in 
other cases. Given that, overall, the law reports from this 
timeframe do not display broad consistency in many respects, 
generalisations of any greater specificity than those set out above 
would therefore be misleading.  
 
 
5. The Types of Judicial Review 
Due to the conceptual complexity and confusion which 
surrounds the second perspective through which reported court 
decisions are analysed in this paper, namely by way of a general 
overview of the types of judicial review which existed during the 
relevant timeframe, the following account is, out of necessity, less 
exhaustive than the foregoing study of remedies. Much of the 
difficulty in discussing different types of judicial review in the UK 
in fact stems from the same soil as the collective incoherence of the 
remedies system, in so far as the historical development of judicial 
supervision over administrative authorities has been marked by 
an inherent sense of ‘hesitation and self-restraint’ borne from the 
‘rather devious way’ in which a series of devices were turned to 
serve different purposes from their original ones over time137. It 
appears to be largely for this reason that most historical judgments 
neither clearly label the grounds on which judicial review was 
conducted nor use perspicuous language to describe the kind of 
intensity with which a particular sort of administrative act was 
evaluated. Quite to the contrary, there was and to some extent still 
is a confusing tendency of both judges and commentators from the 
English tradition to couch all instances of judicial intervention 
within the paradigm of ultra vires theory138. This tendency is of 
course closely connected to fundamental debates about the 
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legitimacy of judicial power over administrative authorities in the 
UK139, but for present purposes it is important only to note by way 
of background information on the tripartite classification of 
judicial review used below. In other words, to distinguish between 
judicial review of ‘jurisdiction’, ‘discretion’ and ‘procedure’ is only 
one of numerous possible taxonomies; one which has been 
adopted mainly for the purpose of digestible exposition. The 
extent to which these categories can be said to have 
contemporaneously constituted distinct ‘heads’ or ‘grounds’ of 
judicial review is a question deliberately left open on account of 
the ambiguity of the historical data available140.  
 
 
5.1 Review of Jurisdiction 
The concept of jurisdiction simply refers to the authority of 
a particular decision-maker to decide something141. While some 
jurists prefer to separate talk of jurisdiction in respect of judicial 
actions from talk of vires in respect of administrative and 
subordinate legislative actions, each term refers to the same 
general idea142. By the relevant timeframe, UK courts had 
developed an important distinction between jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional errors of law and fact143. The key difference 
between them was that jurisdictional errors were essentially 
unreviewable (unless there was an error of law on the face of the 
record). In other words, if a matter was decided within the 
jurisdiction of a particular authority, be it judicial or 
administrative, it was unamenable to judicial review by the High 
Court in all but exceptional circumstances. If, per contra, a non-
jurisdictional error could be established it would provide an 
avenue for judicial intervention. The whole theory worked from 
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the assumption that administrative authorities were only ever 
given power subject to certain conditions. Typically, these 
conditions would include a requirement to determine whether the 
statute which conferred power upon the authority permitted it to 
proceed in the way it proposed to act. Jurists from the relevant 
timeframe were divided, however, over how to decide whether an 
authority had decided such preliminary questions in error. One 
camp argued that the determining factor was the nature of the 
facts which fell to be determined by way of an inquiry preliminary 
to the merits of the decision, rather than the truth or falsity of 
those facts. They also argued that if an authority asked itself the 
correct preliminary questions at the commencement of an inquiry 
then its decisions were conclusively within jurisdiction and would 
therefore be unimpeachable by any court, regardless of whether 
the authority’s decision on the merits was based on completely 
untenable legal principles or factual mistakes. The second camp 
differed from the first primarily by its preference for a broader 
interpretation of the preliminary questions and ‘collateral facts’ 
that related to questions of jurisdiction, which accordingly 
widened the scope of judicial review they viewed as legitimate. 
Reports from the relevant timeframe reveal that different 
judges belonged to different camps, and it is difficult to discern 
whether either camp was significantly larger than the other for 
any sustained period of time (though the latter approach, which 
was more conducive to judicial review, would gain the support of 
a majority in later years). A strong example of a judgment 
exhibiting loyalty to the first camp is that of Buckley J sitting on 
the King’s Bench in the Livingstone case144. The plaintiff was an 
officer of the Corporation of Westminster, which resolved to 
abolish his office while providing him with due compensation 
under powers conferred by the London Government Act 1899. 
One of the preliminary questions to be determined by the Council 
was the value of Mr Livingstone’s salary and emoluments, so that 
his compensation could be calculated accordingly. The Council 
initially granted the amount of compensation Mr Livingstone 
claimed he was entitled to, but after an audit disallowing part of 
the compensatory sum on the ground that it did not correctly 
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reflect his emoluments, the Council rescinded their initial grant 
and reduced the plaintiff’s allowance. When the plaintiff sought to 
judicially review this decision, Buckley J determined that because 
the Council had asked itself the correct preliminary question, 
namely ‘what was the amount of the salary and emoluments of 
the office abolished?’, its substantive decision about the value of 
Mr Livingstone’s compensation fell within the Council’s 
jurisdiction145. As a result, Buckley J held that the court was ‘not 
competent to review their decision’146, subject only to the 
important moral proviso that the Council had acted ‘fairly and 
honestly’147. He summarised this restrictive position memorably as 
follows: 
 
An analogy, although not a perfect one, may be 
found in cases where the jurisdiction of a magistrate 
arises only if a particular fact be found to exist – say, 
for instance, jurisdiction under the game laws. The 
magistrate may convict if the bird be a partridge, but 
not if it be a thrush. It is for the magistrate to decide 
whether it was a partridge or not. If jurisdiction 
arises if an offence charged be true in fact, it is for 
the person whose jurisdiction is invoked to 
determine the fact148. 
 
A telling case involving judges exhibiting loyalty to the 
approach of the second, less restrictive, camp of jurisdiction 
theorists is that of Channell, Bray and Sutton JJ in the Bradford 
case149. A surveyor of the Newton Abbot Rural District Council 
had been authorised by the justices of the Newton Abbot petty 
sessional division to take materials from a five acre plot of land. 
The Highway Act 1835 under which this authorisation had been 
made provided that the justices could authorise highway 
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surveyors to gather materials and so on as required for the 
purpose of repairing the highways, so long as such lands were not 
gardens, yards, avenues, lawns, parks, paddocks or enclosed 
plantations. The authorisation at the heart of the Bradford case 
permitted a surveyor to take materials from a place known as 
Grange Quarry, which formed part of a permanent pasture field 
containing ‘fruit and other ornamental trees’150. The resident of 
this land, Mrs Hare, sought certiorari to quash the justices’ 
decision because, among other things, it was made in respect of 
land which was a park. The justices had determined that the land 
was not a park and, moreover, submitted that whether particular 
land is a park or not was ‘a question of fact which [had to be] 
finally decided by some tribunal or other, and it was probably 
intended by the Act that the local justices, who presumably would 
be well acquainted with the spot, should be that tribunal, rather 
than another Court which was not so acquainted’151. However 
Channel J was wholly unpersuaded by their submission, holding 
that: 
 
…the question whether a place is a park or not is a 
matter which is preliminary to the exercise of the 
justices’ jurisdiction, and one which it is not for the 
justices to finally determine. And if the place is a 
park in fact, they cannot give themselves jurisdiction 
by finding that it is not a park. That being so, the 
question remains whether the land in which the 
quarry is situated is in fact a park or not, and from 
the physical description that has been given of it I 
think we are bound to come to the conclusion that it 
is a park152. 
 
The facts of the Bradford case clearly illustrate how it would 
not be possible for an authority to activate its own jurisdiction by 
way of a factual error when reviewed by judges belonging to the 
second camp of jurisdiction theorists. The concept of jurisdiction 
thus seems to have enabled a results-based procedure at times; 
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whereby a judge of the High Court could choose to intervene in a 
particular case by determining that an issue was non-
jurisdictional, or decline to intervene by defining an issue as 
jurisdictional. The uncertainty this must have caused UK subjects 
does much to discredit those courts with hindsight, though they 
were perhaps doing their best to strike a conceptual balance 
between judicial control and administrative autonomy within the 
confines of a complex jurisprudential heritage153. Moreover, it is 
quite possible that many judges believed they were drawing 
genuine analytical divisions rather than devising instrumental 
constructs154. 
 
5.2 Review of Discretion 
The concept of discretion in UK law has historically been 
used to refer to the power of an administrative authority to choose 
between different options while subject to certain judicially 
enforceable common law constraints. Like most other aspects of 
UK law during the relevant timeframe, these constraints were 
neither fixed nor particularly systematic. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to identify tentatively at least five kinds of common law 
constraint on the exercise of administrative discretion from the 
reports which, although they overlap to some degree, might be 
expressed in modern parlance as follows: a presumption against 
delegation; a presumption against fettering; a rule against 
improper purposes; a requirement of relevancy; and a 
requirement of reasonableness and (in a rather loose sense) 
proportionality.  
Each constraint can be introduced by reference to 
illustrative judicial precedents. With respect to the presumption 
against delegation, the case of High v Billings is apposite155. The 
case concerned a delegation of power by the Hackney District 
Board of Works to one of its surveyors. The Board had authorised 
the surveyor to grant applications for house drainage, which he 
duly did. When, however, an application was granted to lay a 
drain under several properties, the owner of one of them objected 
to it as a nuisance and claimed that the Board had not properly 
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exercised its discretion. It was claimed that by delegating its 
discretion to the surveyor on a very general basis the Board had 
failed to consider each drainage pipe application on its own merits 
and thereby acted contrary to the common law presumption 
against delegation. Lord Alverstone CJ thus ruled that the Board 
could not ‘delegate generally their jurisdiction without judgment 
upon the orders that ought to have been made’156. Simply stated, 
the presumption was that where legislation empowered a 
particular decision-maker to exercise discretion, the decision-
maker was not normally permitted to pass that power to another. 
The presumption against fettering was raised in the Stepney 
decision157. A Council for the Metropolitan Borough of Stepney 
had calculated compensation for an individual by the name of Mr 
Jutsom, whose vestry office had been abolished under powers 
conferred upon the Council by statute. The Council calculated Mr 
Jutsom’s compensation in accordance with a regular practice of 
the Treasury when compensating redundant civil servants. The 
Treasury’s practice in respect of individuals who did not devote 
their whole time to the duties of their office – as was the case in 
respect of Mr Jutsom, who had practiced as a solicitor in addition 
to his vestry office duties – was to deduct a quarter from the 
compensatory figure which would otherwise have been payable. 
Mr Jutsom sought a writ of mandamus from the King’s Bench to 
compel the Council to exercise its discretion with reference to the 
particular facts of his case, rather than by the application of a rigid 
non-statutory rule. A mandamus was granted by the court 
because the Council had fettered its discretion in this way. Darling 
J worded his opinion in these unequivocal terms: 
 
I do not think that the council really did consider the 
matter at all for themselves…They acted upon what 
the Treasury told them was their practice. I do not 
think that they acted, therefore, upon any real 
judgment of their own. They borrowed a measure 
from the Treasury, and they tried to measure what 
they were to give as compensation with that, 
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without applying their own judgment to what they 
were to give at all158.  
 
Denman furnishes a clear demonstration of the rule against 
improper purposes159. The Westminster Corporation had been 
empowered by statute to compulsorily purchase land for the 
purpose of widening streets. The Corporation purported to use 
this power in order to obtain property in a prime London location 
from the Denman company, with the intention of selling it to a 
syndicate of property developers. Buckley J was persuaded to 
grant injunctions restraining the Corporation from doing this, 
however, on the ground that it would not be exercising its 
statutory power for the purpose it was given160. 
The requirement of relevancy had two constraining 
common law dimensions: a requirement on legal decision-makers 
to take all relevant considerations into account when exercising 
their discretion, and a correlate requirement to leave all irrelevant 
considerations out of account. In a case about an individual by the 
name of Mr Robinson, for instance, the latter requirement to leave 
all irrelevant considerations out of account is apparent from the 
reasoning of the judges161. Thus, granting a liquor license to Mr 
Robinson with reference to the irrelevant fact that he normally 
superintended for twelve hours per day the premises which were 
being considered for licensing, taking his meals there and so on, 
was immaterial. The relevant statutory requirement was that he 
had to actually reside on the premises, which he did not. Lawrance 
and Channell JJ therefore agreed to quash the relevant authority’s 
decision to grant a license in Mr Robinson’s favour by certiorari 
and ordered by mandamus that his application be reheard (while 
cognisant that it remained likely to be refused)162.  
Finally, administrative discretion during the relevant 
timeframe was subject to a relatively novel standard of 
reasonableness and (in a rather loose sense) proportionality163. Its 
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principal promulgators seem to have been Lord Halsbury LC, 
Lord Russell CJ and Lord Macnaughten in the three celebrated 
cases of Sharp v Wakefield, Kruse v Johnson, and North Western 
Railway. In the first case, Lord Halsbury LC said this: 
 
“discretion” means when it is said that something is 
to be done within the discretion of the authorities 
that that something is to be done according to the 
rules of reason and justice, not according to private 
opinion … according to law, and not humour. It is to 
be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and 
regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to 
which an honest man competent to the discharge of 
his office ought to confine himself164. 
 
In the second case, in respect of by-laws, Lord Russell CJ 
considered a number of authorities which informed his view that 
a court could intervene on grounds of unreasonableness if it could 
be shown that a by-law was ‘manifestly unjust, capricious, 
inequitable, or partial in its operation’165. Moreover, in describing 
the limits of what was reasonable and therefore lawful in the 
exercise of the power to make by-laws, Lord Russell referred to 
‘such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those 
subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of 
reasonable men’166 – a test in which, as Stephen Sedley has 
perceptively identified, ‘it is not entirely fanciful to see the embryo 
of a doctrine of proportionality’167. In the third case, Lord 
Macnaughten confidently ruled that: 
 
It is well settled that a public body invested with 
statutory powers … must take care not to exceed or 
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abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of 
the authority committed to it. It must act in good 
faith. And it must act reasonably168. 
 
Moreover, shortly after the relevant timeframe Lord 
Macnaughten invalidated a decision of the New South Wales 
Public Service Board regarding the value of a retirement gratuity 
on account of his contention that the Board’s discretion had to be 
exercised ‘reasonably, fairly, and justly’169. There can be no doubt, 
therefore, that some courts were willing to vigorously apply 
normative moral standards defined by the common law to the 
conduct of administrative authorities during the relevant 
timeframe, ostensibly undeterred by the fact those standards 
lacked any specific legislative basis.  
 
5.3 Review of Procedure 
The notion that adjudicative procedures should conform to 
a standard of ‘natural justice’ during the relevant timeframe was 
given effect in the UK primarily through the application of two 
important judicial principles: that parties to a judicial 
determination should be given adequate notice and a fair hearing 
(audi alteram partem) and that a judge should be disinterested 
and unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua).  
At the beginning of the relevant timeframe, the right to a 
fair hearing with adequate notice was applied in the case of 
Hopkins, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that where a building 
had been erected contrary to the by-laws of the Smethwick Local 
Board of Health, the Board could not exercise its statutory power 
to demolish that building without giving the owner notice and an 
opportunity to be heard170. Likewise, a school master who was 
going to be dismissed by a board of vicars was able to have his 
dismissal provisionally injuncted because this ‘elementary 
principle of justice’ had been neglected171. Mr Fisher had not been 
informed of the charges against him or provided with an 
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opportunity of answering them172. At the end of the relevant 
timeframe, moreover, Lord Loreburn LC delivered a sweeping 
statement of the principle in the often cited Board of Education v 
Rice case which was briefly referred to earlier173. It was in this case 
that he said any official determining matters of law ‘must act in 
good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying 
upon every one who decides anything’174. Significant though this 
judicial attitude to the reach of the principle was, it should be 
noted that it was heavily watered down a few years later in the 
case of Arlidge; wherein it was held inapplicable to statutory 
inquiries, which were a newly constituted form of administrative 
procedure175. Some commentators credit the creeping in of 
Diceyan influence by this time for the increase in judicial 
deference which the change in Arlidge came to represent176. 
The principle that no man should be a judge in his own 
cause arose in judicial review cases of two main sorts, which 
reflect the modern-day framework for understanding it to a fair 
extent177. The first sort of case would typically concern a decision-
maker who could be shown to have a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of decision. The case of Gaisford is a good example178. Mr 
Gaisford, who was both a magistrate and a ratepayer in the 
relevant parish, suggested in his capacity as a ratepayer at a parish 
meeting about highway matters that legal proceedings should be 
taken against the applicant in respect of materials the latter had 
deposited on a highway. After a summons was issued to the 
applicant, he attended a hearing where the very magistrate who 
had moved to initiate the proceedings against him, Mr Gaisford, 
was sitting on the court responsible for determining his case. The 
Queen’s Bench therefore granted certiorari to quash the 
magistrate’s order for the applicant’s deposited materials to be 
removed and sold, because it was  
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well-known law that the same person shall not act 
both as accuser and judge; and also that a man shall 
not act as a judge in a case in the decision of which 
he has a pecuniary interest, unless relieved by 
statute; the fact that a man has even the slightest 
pecuniary interest operates to disqualify him from 
adjudicating upon a case179. 
 
The second sort of case would generally involve a decision-
maker who could be shown to have some other bias or 
predilection towards the outcome of their decision as a result of 
institutional affiliations. The test applied in such cases was 
whether the circumstances gave rise to a ‘real likelihood of bias’180. 
The Court of Appeal held that this test was satisfied in the Justices 
of Sunderland case, for example. The justices involved were also 
members of a borough council; a council which had agreed, in 
essence, to orchestrate the transfer of a liquor license in force in 
respect of a hotel it owned. The justices, having participated in this 
agreement, had subsequently heard and granted a licensing 
application made by the very company which had agreed to pay 
the council a sum of money if its liquor license was successfully 
transferred. Having considered ‘whether, under the 
circumstances, there was a real likelihood that these justices, by 
reason of the part which they took in the negotiations for the 
agreement, would have a bias in favour of the application for a 
license’, the King’s Bench concluded that there was indeed such a 
likelihood and therefore quashed it by issuing a writ of 
certiorari181.  
 
5.4 Summary 
The foregoing analysis makes it quite plain that the types of 
review which an applicant could seek to have applied to 
administrative decisions during the relevant timeframe were 
judicial creations. It is equally clear that they were conceptually 
limited to neither legislative intent nor private interests, given that 
they also included certain rules grounded in abstract notions of 
                                               
179 R v Gaisford [1892] 1 QB 381, 384. 
180 R v Justices of Sunderland [1901] 2 KB 357, 364. 
181 R v Justices of Sunderland [1901] 2 KB 357, 372. 
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justice. This much underlines the point that courts have 
historically played a very significant role in the development of 
substantive administrative law in the UK. Were it not for a certain 
level of judicial audacity and moral leadership, as is evidenced in 
some of the reports discussed above, it is entirely possible that 
administrative power in the UK might have been exercised in 
pursuance of rather different conceptual goals. 
 
 
6. The Frequency of Judicial Review 
It was possible in the course of the research underpinning 
this report to undertake some quantitative analysis on the 
frequency of administrative law cases heard by UK courts during 
the relevant timeframe. This quantitative analysis was, however, 
necessarily crude in nature and must be heavily caveated due to 
the following significant methodological limitations.  
First, annual figures were aggregated from six series of law 
reports which were identified as being likely to contain relevant 
reports over the period of time under study. In the absence of an 
‘official’ series of law reports in the UK, the most authoritative 
privately published reports available were examined182. It is 
possible that certain cases were reported by more than one of 
these publishers183, but due to limited time and resources it was 
not possible to sift out any redundant results of this kind. It is also 
possible that cases are omitted which did not feature in any of 
these particular series and, indeed, cases which were not reported 
anywhere at all. Paul Craig has noted in a different context that 
such omissions might exist because it may have been felt at the 
time that a case raised no novel points of law and failed to qualify 
for reporting as a result, despite being important for the present 
purpose of accurately depicting the incidence of judicial review184. 
                                               
182 Namely four series of the Law Reports by the Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting for England and Wales (the Appeal Cases series, the King’s/Queen’s 
Bench Division series, the Chancery Division series, and the Probate/Family 
series), together with the All England Law Reports Reprint series and the All 
England Law Reports Reprint Extension series.  
183 The risk of duplication is happily limited in this context to that which might 
exist between the four series by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for 
England and Wales, and the two series published by the All England Law 
Reports. 
184 P. Craig cit. at 140, 28. 
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Second, the historic law reports discussed above do not 
themselves attempt to distinguish between administrative and 
non-administrative law cases. Given that the overall number of 
cases reported therein between 1890 and 1910 is in the tens of 
thousands, it was again impractical to conduct a manual sifting 
exercise. It was therefore necessary to develop several batches of 
search terms with the aim of returning search results from within 
the relevant law reports which would exclude non-administrative 
law cases. A broad, potentially over-inclusive batch of search 
terms (‘Batch A’) was refined in several iterations by removing 
search terms which seemed – on the basis of some necessarily 
cursory checks – to skew the results by returning predominantly 
non-administrative law cases. A narrow, potentially under-
inclusive batch of search terms (‘Batch B’) was refined using the 
same technique. Batch A was broad in the sense that it included, 
for instance, the names of various bodies which would have been 
subject to administrative law at the time185. It thus included terms 
likely to return figures for collateral challenges to administrative 
authorities, although this inevitably increased the risk of some 
anomalous results186. Batch B was narrow in the sense that it was 
restricted, for the most part, to the names of administrative law 
remedies and the grounds for judicial review recognised at the 
time187.  
As expected, Batch A returned a much larger set of results 
than Batch B. Also as expected, it was clear that Batch A contained 
a number of anomalous results and could only be taken to reflect a 
rather inflated depiction of the incidence of administrative law 
cases. Likewise, Batch B seemed to reflect a deflated depiction. In 
the absence of sufficient time and resources to manually sift the 
results at this third stage of the quantitative research 
methodology, it was decided that the most practical solution was 
to take an average of the number of results returned by both 
batches of search terms and to rely on that number as the best 
possible estimate of administrative law cases reported each year. 
The word estimate in this phrase makes it clear that the 
quantitative analysis which follows is based on imperfect 
                                               
185 For example: commissioners, inspectors, tribunals, boards, inquiries, 
corporations, and so on.  
186 On collateral challenges, see: P. Craig cit. at 140, 27-28. 
187 For example: certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, natural justice, and so on. 
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calculations, while the words best possible are indicative of the 
relatively thorough yet time- and resource-limited methodology 
that lies behind the numbers involved in the calculations.  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
The above graph (Figure 1) summarises the findings of this 
quantitative enquiry. The aggregate search results – that is, the 
sum of the number of search results returned for each of the six 
series of law reports identified above – are shown for Batch A in 
green and Batch B in blue. The average of these results is 
represented by the yellow line on the graph. Figure 1 illustrates that 
although the volume of results returned for each batch of search 
terms varied considerably, the same general trends in frequency 
are clearly discernible (which is only partially due to overlaps in 
the relevant search terms). This reinforces the reliability of the 
average results to some extent, and the brief commentary below 
focuses on them accordingly. For ease of reference, the average 
results – representing the best possible estimate of the annual 
frequency of administrative law cases in the UK between 1890 and 
1910 – are isolated in a graph of their own (Figure 2) below: 
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Figure 2 
 
The most striking feature of this data is its demonstration of 
the generally stable incidence of administrative law cases 
throughout most of the 20-year period studied. Apart from the 
fairly significant initial jump in case numbers between 1890 and 
1891, the graph does not tell a story of gradually increasing 
frequency in administrative law cases but rather one of relative 
stability.  
A related point of interest arises from the data, namely its 
comparative similarity to modern-day data on the frequency of 
administrative law cases in the UK. When drawing a comparison 
between this historical time period and the present day, however, 
certain contextual factors should be borne in mind. Foremost 
among these factors is the considerable growth in population 
numbers that has taken place within the UK, which may 
reasonably account for a relative increase in administrative law 
case numbers188. Moreover, modern figures should be screened so 
as to remove the number of applications for leave to apply for 
judicial review, given that historical figures relating to the UK 
landscape prior to 1933 deal solely with the law reports available 
for substantive judicial review hearings (which were subject to a 
very different procedure that placed the onus on respondents to 
show cause as to why a provisionally granted remedy should not 
be made final)189. The requirement of leave to apply for judicial 
review which was introduced in 1933190 has resulted in much 
                                               
188 P. Craig cit. at 140, 28. 
189 A. Le Seur and M. Sunkin, Applications for Judicial Review: The Requirement for 
Leave, Public Law 102 (1992). 
190 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933. 
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fewer substantive hearings of the sort represented in the graph 
above. For example, while in 2011 there was over 11,000 
applications for leave (or ‘permission’ as it now called in England 
and Wales191) to apply for judicial review, only about 1,200 of 
those cases were granted permission to proceed to a substantive 
hearing; of which fewer than 400 actually reached the hearing 
stage on account of out-of-court settlements192. Taking these 
factors properly into account, the overall average of 286 
administrative law cases per year illustrated by this graph at the 
very least corroborates Paul Craig’s claim that it is not ‘self-
evident’ that judicial review was less used in the past than it is 
now193. Indeed, the numbers appear to be markedly similar. 
One final observation remains to be made, based on a 
quantitative analysis of the law reports adverted to above using a 
separate and distinct set of search terms. This set of search terms 
was devised specifically in order to discover the extent to which 
Dicey and his controversial legal scholarship on constitutional law 
was referred to by UK courts between 1890 and 1910.  A graph is 
not necessary to illustrate the frequency of results on an annual 
basis as the overall number of results is so limited, totalling a 20-
year aggregate of 91. The vast majority of these results, moreover, 
were of two anomalous types. First, many of the results returned 
concerned references by the courts to Dicey’s book on private 
international law194. The courts certainly treated this work with 
respect, commenting for example that a particular matter of 
construction appeared ‘to be well summed up in Mr. Dicey’s work 
on Conflict of Laws’195, but never with the level of deferential 
favour which his earlier constitutional law scholarship would later 
attract among judges down the decades. Second, a fairly large 
proportion of results concerned Dicey’s personal appearance in 
cases as senior counsel196. As was the case in respect of his private 
                                               
191 Civil Procedure Rules, Pt 54.4.  
192 H. Woolf and others (eds.) cit. at 23, 29. 
193 P. Craig cit. at 140, 28. 
194 A. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(1896); A. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of 
Laws, 2nd ed. (1908). 
195 Harding v Commissioners of Stamps for Queensland [1898] AC 769, 774. 
196 Dicey did not appear as junior counsel in any cases within this date range 
given that he took silk at the very beginning of 1890. 
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international law scholarship, the weight of Dicey’s 
representations as senior counsel do not appear to have attracted 
particular preferment from the judiciary of this era. In the 
charitable tax allowance case of Pemsel, for example, among 
Dicey’s (jointly prepared) submissions was the procedural 
contention that mandamus ought not to lie against the 
respondents as Crown servants; his argument being that the 
proper remedy lay by way of petition of right197. Lord Herschell 
dismissed that argument, however, on the basis that mandamus 
was not sought in order to compel the payment of money to which 
the applicant was allegedly entitled, which would be recoverable 
by petition of right, but to compel the issuance of an allowance 
and certificate which was needed in order to maintain a petition of 
right198.  
Perhaps most notably, Dicey’s revered work on the 
constitution199 appears to have been cited and expressly 
considered only once during this time period. In the case of Wise v 
Dunning200, which determined that jurisdiction existed to bind 
over a public speaker who indirectly incited breaches of the peace, 
counsel for the appellant drew the court’s attention to Dicey’s 
constitutional law book in an attempt to further the argument that 
no jurisdiction existed in the circumstances of the case201. 
Although Dicey did indeed claim that there was inconsistency 
between certain judicial authorities, Lord Alverstone CJ ruled that 
having ‘closely examined’ them for himself he was unable to agree 
with Dicey’s opinion (though his ruling was prefaced by generally 
respectful and complimentary language about the ‘very learned 
lawyer and writer’)202. This singular and ultimately discredited 
reference, together with the largely anomalous references 
discussed above, suggests that during the relevant timeframe the 
development of judicial standards of administrative law in the UK 
– quite apart from other areas such as private international law – 
                                               
197 Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, 
536. 
198 Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, 
569. 
199 A. Dicey cit. at 34.  
200 Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 KB 167. 
201 Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 KB 167, 172. 
202 Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 KB 167, 174. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 10   ISSUE 1/2018 
95 
 
was in fact very infrequently, it at all, explicitly influenced by 
Diceyan jurisprudence.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
While an attempt to recapitulate the full findings of this 
report in any detail would be lengthy and repetitious, it is 
worthwhile to note some general observations which emerge from 
its coverage of the context, reach, types and frequency of judicial 
review between 1890 and 1910. The first of these observations is 
that whereas the remedies for judicial review were clearly 
characterised by bespoke rules and procedures that made them 
relatively distinct and intelligible, the types of review that could 
be argued in UK courts were rather hazily defined and applied; 
sometimes with reference to a specific doctrine, at other times 
under the broad rhetoric of ultra vires theory. In addition, the 
tendency of courts to formulate jurisprudential constructs which 
enabled them to decide cases according to their own preferences 
rather than with reference to clear principles is discernible in a 
number of areas. The judicial choice involved in determining 
whether a matter was administrative or judicial for the purposes 
of granting access to the writs of prohibition and certiorari 
highlights this point as much as the judicial choice involved in 
deciding whether to classify matters as either jurisdictional or 
non-jurisdictional. The apparent lack of structure, certainty and 
consistency engendered by these constructs, however, does not 
mean that there was no body of substantive law at all that could 
be properly termed administrative. The law reports are replete 
with examples of judicial attempts to define and refine general 
principles of law, in some instances more indeterminate than 
others, for the purposes of both facilitating and controlling 
administrative authorities. In this regard, the law reports 
manifestly confirm the historically ‘Janus-like’ nature of judicial 
review in the UK203. In other words, they do not support the idea 
that judges were committed to restraining administrative actions 
with reference to independently formed moral precepts and 
nothing else. Although it is true that this was undoubtedly their 
motivation at times (which the cases on unreasonableness and 
                                               
203 P. Craig cit. at 140, 62-65. 
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natural justice amply demonstrate), judicial constructs were also 
devised and modified in order to effectuate the administrative 
arrangements contested before them. The rule against improper 
purposes well exemplifies this point. Legal theories centred on 
Diceyan foundations (and indeed other unitary schools of 
thought) which fail to acknowledge this duality of purpose should 
be treated with caution. The empirical evidence provided by 
historical law reports, disorganised and heterogeneous though it 
may be, is a heavy counterweight to many of their claims. 
